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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS 
DISTRICT UNION LOCAL ONE, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5237 
TOWN OF NORTH ELBA, 
Employer. 
BELSON, CAMPBELL & SZUFLITA (GENE M. J. SZUFLITA of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
DANIEL P. MCKILLIP, ESQ., for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On August 15, 2002, the United Food and Commercial Workers District Union 
Local One, AFL-CIO filed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Public 
Employment Relations Board, a timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the Town of North Elba. 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in which they stipulated 
that the following negotiating units were appropriate: 
Included: Unit 1: All full-time and part-time (working at least 20 hours per 
week) permanent employees in the following tities: 
Landfill Attendant, Watchman, Recycling Attendant, Motor 
Equipment Operator, Auto Mechanic/Highway, Heavy Equipment 
Operator, Cemetery Attendant and Landfill Operator. 
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Excluded: All other employees. 
Included: Unit 2: All full-time and part-time (working at least 20 hours per 
week) permanent employees in the following titles: 
Majntenance(Person, Park Attendant, Auto^M 
Clerk, Clerk/Typist, Cleaner, Groundskeeper, Account Clerk, and 
Greenskeeper. 
Excluded: All other employees including the Confidential Secretary of the 
Town Supervisor. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was held in both units on 
October 29, 2002, at which a majority of ballots was cast against representation by the 
petitioner in Unit 2. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a majority of the eligible 
voters in Unit 2 who cast ballots do not desire to be represented for the purpose of 
collective bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition with respect to 
Unit 2 should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
As to Unit 1, pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Food and Commercial Workers 
District Union Local One has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer in Unit 1, agreed upon by the parties 
and described above, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED, that the above named public employer shall 
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negotiate collectively with the United Food and Commercial Workers District Union 
Local One as the exclusive bargaining representative of Unit 1. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, 
or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession.1 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
A, 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
1
 Member Abbott recused himself from consideration of this case. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED FEDERATION OF POLICE OFFICERS, INC., 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5205 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
THOMAS P. HALLEY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
STEVEN J. WING, ASSISTANT CORPORATION COUNSEL, for 
Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARILYN S. DYMOND 
of counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United Federation of Police 
Officers, Inc. (Federation) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
dismissing its petition for decertification of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 'CSEA^ as the renresentative of a unit of ermlo^ees 
employed at the water treatment plant jointly owned by the City of Poughkeepsie (City) 
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and the Town of Poughkeepsie (Town), and for certification of the Federation as their 
representative. CSEA has intervened in this proceeding. 
At the pre-hearing conference, the City and CSEA took the position that the 
Federation's petition was time-barred under §201.3(e) of our Rules of Procedure 
(Rules) because the City and CSEA had negotiated a successor agreement. The ALJ 
gave the Federation,an opportunity to offer proof demonstrating that its petition was 
timely. The ALJ thereafter dismissed the petition as untimely on August 30, 2002. 
On September 18, 2002, the Federation filed its exceptions with us without proof 
of service on the other parties to this proceeding. By letter dated October 22, 2002 to 
the Federation's counsel, we requested that he provide us with proof of service. We 
received the Federation's affidavit of service sworn to on October 24, 2002, stating that 
copies of the exceptions and petitioner's brief were served on the other parties on 
October 24, 2002. 
In their response to the Federation's exceptions, CSEA and the City request that 
the Federation's exceptions be dismissed as untimely. 
Section 213.2(a) of the Rules requires a party filing exceptions to also serve 
those exceptions on all other parties within the same fifteen working day period and, in 
addition, to file proof of such service with us. The record is clear that the Federation 
failed to serve its exceptions on the other parties within fifteen working days after receipt 
of the ALJ's decision on September 9, 2002. We have consistently held that timely 
service upon other parties is a component of timely filing. Consequently, we will dismiss 
exceptions that have not been timely served. In prior decisions in which we have 
dismissed exceptions for failure of timely service, our decision has been prompted by an 
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objection from one or more of the parties who was not timely served.1 We here 
determine that requiring strict compliance with the filing requirements of our Rules with 
respect to the service of exceptions on all affected parties at the same time they are 
filed with the Board should not be dependent upon the urging of one of the parties to the 
proceeding.2 
We have held that failureto properly and timely: serve exceptions upon the other 
parties is a failure of timely service.3 That an affected party does not object or fails to 
respond cannot cure the defect in service. 
Based upon the foregoing, we need not reach the merits of the Federation's 
exceptions. Thus, the exceptions are dismissed and the ALJ's decision dismissing the 
Federation's petition for decertification/certification is affirmed. SO ORDERED.« 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
£. A. Abbott, Member 
(John T. Mitchell, Member 
1
 Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Gore), 35 PERB 
1J3012 (2002); City of Watervliet, 30 PERB 1J3024 (1997); Ballston Spa Educ. Ass'n and 
Ballston Spa Cent. Sch. Dist, 25 PERB 1J3084 (1992); United Fed'n of Teachers 
(Costabile), 25 PERB 1J3034 (1992). 
2Catskill Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 14 PERB 1J3075 (1981) (subsequent history 
omitted). 
3City of Albany v. Newman, 181 AD2d 953, 25 PERB 1J7002 (3d Dep't 1992). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION CASE NO. D-0272 
Upon the Charge of Violation of §210.1 of the 
Civil Service Law. 
MICHAEL B. RISMAN, CORPORATION COUNSEL (MATTHEW C. 
VAN VESSEM of counsel), for City of Buffalo 
SCHWAN & SAMMARCO (W. JAMES SCHWAN of counsel), for Buffalo 
Police Benevolent Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case is before us upon submission of a report and recommendations by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a strike charge filed by the chief legal officer of the 
City of Buffalo (City) against the Buffalo Police Benevolent Association (PBA). 
The ALJ found that while police officers represented by the PBA had not 
voluntarily applied for transfer to particular police department units pursuant to a PBA 
resolution prohibiting their participation in the City's new transfer procedure, they had 
not defied directions to perform assigned duties nor had they withheld services. He, 
therefore, recommended that the charge filed by the City alleging that the PBA had 
violated §210.1 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) be dismissed. 
EXCEPTIONS 
T h e CitV eXCeDtS tQ t h e A L J ' S r e p o r t gn r l rec~>mmen<"1atinns a r m i i n n t h a t th<=» A l .I 
erred in finding that the PBA resolution was not a strike and that the refusal of police 
officers to apply for transfers using a new procedure implemented by the City did not 
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constitute a refusal to perform assigned duties. The PBA responded that the City's 
exceptions were not timely filed.1 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we adopt the report and recommendations of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's report and recommendations2 and 
are repeated here only as relevant to our decision. 
In 1990, the City and the PBA entered into an agreement on transfer policies and 
procedures (Agreement). The parties' collective bargaining agreement also contains 
language relevant to transfers which provides that: 
The vacancy or position shall be filled on the basis of 
seniority provided the senior applicant has the ability and 
meets the qualifications as specified by the Commissioner of 
Police prior to the filling of the vacancy. In the event that no 
one in the affected precinct bids on the vacancy/position, the 
position shall be filled by the employee within the affected 
precinct with the least seniority, that has the ability and 
meets the qualifications as specified by the Commissioner of 
Police.3 
The City attempted to meet with the PBA to address changes in the transfer • 
policy from March 2000 to March 2001. One meeting was held in June 2000. 
Thereafter, the City developed and established new criteria for assignment to the 
1
 The City received the ALJ's report and recommendations on September 6, 2002. The 
exceptions were filed on September 26, 2002, within fifteen working days of the City's 
receipt of the ALJ's report and recommendations, and are, therefore, properly before us. 
Rules of Procedure, §206.7(a) and §213. 
2
 Buffalo Police Benev. Ass'n, 35 PERB 1J8001 (2002). 
3
 Article X, 10.1. 
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Narcotics/Vice bureau, effective May 21, 2001. The PBA then filed a grievance and an 
improper practice charge.4 On October 29, 2001, the City announced the new 
qualifications it had established for transfer to the NarcoticsA/ice bureau and voided all 
pending transfer requests for transfer to that bureau. The PBA then filed a second 
grievance.5 
At its November 5, 2001 delegates' meeting, the PBA adopted a resolution 
providing that no member of the bargaining unit would submit any application form for 
transfer to the Narcotics, Vice or Intelligence bureaus; that members continue to follow 
the transfer procedures set forth in the Agreement; and that members who violate the 
resolution would be subject to union charges. 
Since January 10, 2002, no police officer has filed a request to transfer to the 
NarcoticsA/ice bureau.6 In the past, between eight and sixteen such requests were filed 
each month. No transfer assignments have been made to the Narcotics bureau since 
the City announced the changed procedure for transfer in October 2001. 
Commissioner of Police, Rocco Diina, testified that the PBA resolution "stagnated 
any ability to transfer officers into the unit".7 No police officer is under any obligation to 
"The improper practice charge was conditionally dismissed, pending a decision on the 
grievance. City of Buffalo, 34 PERB 1J4575 (2001). 
5
 The PBA submitted a copy of the Arbitrator's award on the grievances, dated October 
14, 2002, to this Board after the date for submission of a response to the exceptions. 
We have, therefore, not considered it. 
6
 From the time of the adoption of the PBA. resolution to Januan/ 2002, five officers 
requested transfer to Narcotics. Each utilized the form adopted as part of the 
Agreement and did not comply with the City's new transfer request procedures. One did 
not follow up on the request and one withdrew the request. 
7
 Transcript, pp. 169-70. 
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submit a transfer request and no order has been given to a police officer to submit a 
transfer request. 
DISCUSSION 
The City argues that the refusal of police officers to conform to its directives on 
transfer requests or to submit any transfer requests to the NarcoticsA/ice bureau 
represents a failure to perform duties in the usual and customary manner, and 
constitutes a concerted stoppage of work or a slowdown that was instigated, 
encouraged and condoned by the PBA, in violation of §210 of the Act. We disagree. 
The City likens the failure of its police officers to request transfer to the 
NarcoticsA/ice bureau to a concerted withholding of volunteer services, which we have 
found can constitute a strike.8 The ALJ correctly rejected the City's argument that the 
police officers had withheld voluntary services, finding that the City's reliance on Local 
826, Council 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO9 was misplaced. 
In Yonkers Firefighters, Local 62, IAFF10, we distinguished between the 
withholding of volunteer services and declination of the invitation to volunteer. In that 
case, as here, there is no viable claim that any police officers have refused to conform 
to directions from the City to perform work, nor have any services been withheld. Police 
B
 Plainedge Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1380, 11 PERB 1J3060 (1978). See also 
Horseheads Teachers Association and NYSUT, 15 PERB 1J3110 (1982); Bellmore-
Merrick Cent. High Sch. Dist. v. Bellmore-Merrick United Secondary Teachers, Inc., 85 
Misc. 2d 282, 8 PERB 1J7518 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1975); Amalgamated Transit 
i ; « ; i ,,./ i-»:..:„: c o n o n r n n n o n c n //in-7c:\ 
UIIIUII, uuuai uiviz>iuii uou, o r c r \ D ]jouOO ( i » / u). 
9
 12 PERB 113003(1979). 
12 PERB P067 (1979). 
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officers have never been directed to request transfers, their failure to do so now cannot 
be found to be a refusal to follow a directive. 
As we held in Yonkers, supra, "The City's interests were not adversely affected 
by the [police officers'] action. It was neither deprived of services nor burdened by an 
obligation not already contemplated by its contract."11 The City is contractually permitted 
to fill vacancies with the least senior police officer in the affected precinct who has the 
ability and is qualified to fill the vacancy. That the City has chosen not to make such 
assignments to fill its perceived need for additional personnel in NarcoticsA/ice does not 
mean that police officers have withheld services. The declination of the invitation to 
volunteer, or the declination of the opportunity to request a transfer, cannot be equated 
with the failure to obey a direction or the withholding of required services. That some 
police officers withdrew their requests for transfer rather than follow the City's new 
procedures or used the transfer request procedure set forth in the Agreement, is not, as 
argued by the City, a refusal to follow a directive. There is no evidence in the record 
that, in the past, once a transfer request had been submitted it could not be withdrawn. 
There has been no work stoppage or slow down shown on this record. The City 
may, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, involuntarily transfer the least 
senior police officer to fill a vacancy. In such manner, the City may address any staffing 
shortages or workload concerns in the NarcoticsA/ice bureau. 
Accordingly, we affirm the determination of the ALJ that the action alleged in the 
City's charge did not constitute a strike within the meaning of §201.9 of the Act. 
11
 Id. at 3117. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
ael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Jbhn T. Mitchell, Member (7 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU CASE NOS. 1-0047 & 1-0048 
for a determination pursuant toCSL §212. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Section 212 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) declares certain 
provisions of the Act inapplicable to those local governments which have adopted their 
own provisions and procedures which have been submitted to this Board and as to 
which "there is in effect a determination by the board that such provisions and 
procedures and the continuing implementation thereof are substantially equivalent 
to those which control this Board. In essence, §212 of the Act allows local governments 
to establish local PERBs which have authority similar to, although more limited than, 
that of this Board. 
Part 203 of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules)1 governs the review of local 
government procedures under §212 of the Act by the Public Employment Relations 
Board (State PERB). Pursuant to §203.8 of the Rules, the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) filed a petition on April 5, 2000, 
and the Nassau County Sheriff Officers Association, Inc. (SOA) filed a petition on May 
3, 2000, seeking review of the provisions and procedures of the County of Nassau's 
1
 4 NYCRR 200 et seq. 
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PERB (Nassau PERB) enacted pursuant to §212 of the Act and approved by order of 
the State PERB on January 27, 1982.2 CSEA and SOA claimed that the Nassau PERB 
had been unable to implement its procedures and sought to have the State PERB 
rescind its 1982 order approving the Nassau PERB's provisions and procedures. Absent 
action by the Nassau PERB and Nassau County, this Board could have made a 
determination.on the petitions pursuant to„§203,8(h) of our Rules. 
Section 203.6 of the Rules governs termination of a local PERB and provides as 
follows: 
[T]ermination shall become effective no sooner than 60 days after the 
filing with the board of a duly certified copy of a local law, ordinance or 
resolution of such local government terminating the applicability of the 
local provisions and procedures, or on the date specified in the local 
law, ordinance or resolution, whichever is later. . . . [T]he local 
government will give public notice of the termination of the local 
procedures at least 45 days prior to the effective date thereof, by 
posting in a conspicuous place at suitable offices of its own for not less 
than five working days and inclusion in a public advertisement in a local 
newspaper of general circulation for not less than one day. 
On September 23, 2002, the Nassau County Legislature adopted Ordinance No. 
109-2002, which repealed an earlier ordinance establishing the Nassau PERB. 
Ordinance No. 109-2002, further directed compliance with §203.6 of the Rules. 
Ordinance No. 109-2002 was approved by the Nassau County Executive on September 
30, 2002, and copies were posted, from October 15, 2002 to December 4, 2002, in the 
Ralph G. Caso Legislative and Executive Office Building, the Nassau County Supreme 
Court Building and the Nassau County Comptroller's Office. The ordinance was 
published in Newsday, a newspaper published In the County of Nassau and other 
counties, on October 18, 2002, and filed with the State PERB on November 26, 2002. 
2
 County of Nassau, 15 PERB P009 (1982). 
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We find that the County of Nassau has fully complied with §203.6 of the Rules to 
terminate a local PERB and we, therefore, determine that our January 27, 1982 order 
approving the provisions and procedures of the Nassau PERB and the continuing 
implementation thereof should be rescinded. In light of this finding, we further determine 
that CSEA's and SOA's petitions seeking rescission of our January 27, 1982 order are 
..now., .moat. ...._.._ . ._ . .... 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the order of this Board, dated January 
27, 1982, approving the enactment establishing the Nassau PERB be, and the same 
hereby is, rescinded; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any and all matters pending before the Nassau 
PERB be forwarded to this Board for further processing; 
AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the petitions of CSEA and SOA be, and 
the same hereby are, dismissed in their entirety. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/ JJohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PORT JEFFERSON TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-21696 
PORT JEFFERSON UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
DANIEL A. BAHR, for Charging Party 
INGERMAN SMITH, L.L.P. (JOHN H. GROSS of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Port Jefferson Union Free 
School District (District) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that 
the District violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it unilaterally subcontracted the exclusive work of employees in the unit 
represented by the Port Jefferson Teachers' Association (Association), prompting the 
filing of the instant improper practice charge by the Association. 
The ALJ found that the District had contracted with a private psychiatrist to 
perform educational testing mandated by the District's Committee for Special Education 
(CSE). Rejecting the District's timeliness defense, the ALJ then determined that such 
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testing had been exclusively performed by special education teachers in the 
Association's unit and ordered the work restored to the unit.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
The District excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by finding 
that the at-issue work had been performed exclusively by unit employees. The 
Association,supports the ALU's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The relevant facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision2 and are repeated 
here only as necessary for our decision. 
The CSE is mandated by State Education Law to evaluate students to determine 
whether they have a handicap that qualifies them for an individual assistance plan 
(IAP). Without notable exception, the District's special education teachers have 
performed the evaluations in their capacity as educational evaluators. The District 
offered evidence of 1000 evaluations conducted on its students from as early as 1986. 
Of those evaluations, only thirteen contain educational testing done by individuals not 
employed by the District. Nine of the thirteen include outside testing that was performed 
at the request of the student's parents, before the student was referred to CSE.3 While 
1
 No exception was taken to the ALJ's timeliness determination and we, therefore, do 
not reach it. 
2
 35 PERB H4570 (2002). 
3
 Of the remaining four, the record shows only that two were outside evaluations 
conducted concurrently with CSEA's evaluation and one was pursuant to CSE referral. 
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the District asserts that it pays for outside evaluations or reimburses the parents, no 
evidence was offered in support of this assertion. 
DISCUSSION 
The initial inquiry in a unilateral reassignment of unit work case is whether the 
bargaining unit has exclusively performed the in-issue work. If there is no exclusivity, 
._our inquiry ends.4 Here, the ALJdetermined, thattha definition of unit work isinitial 
testing directed by the CSE, drawing a discernible boundary which would exclude those 
instances in which evaluations were conducted at the request of the student's parents.5 
The work performed by the unit is the initial evaluation of students to determine 
eligibility for an IAP. The instances cited by the District do.not alter the definition of unit 
work and do not breach the Association's exclusivity. Of the thirteen outside 
evaluations, nine were not performed at the District's direction and were outside the 
District's control. Unless the employer has control over the transfer of unit work to 
nonunit employees, there is no duty to bargain the transfer.6 Such a transfer cannot be 
seen as a breach of the union's exclusivity. 
The remaining four instances are too inconsequential to affect the Association's 
exclusivity even if the record established that the work had been assigned by the 
District, with the Association's knowledge and acquiescence. Four instances out of one 
4
 See County of Erie (Erie Community College), 31 PERB 1J3043 (1998). 
5
 Indian River Cent Sch. Dist., 20 PERB <{3Q47 (1987); Town of West Seneca, 19 
PERB 113028(1986). 
6
 Town ofBrookhaven, 28 PERB fl3010 (1995). See also Cortland Paid Fire Fighters 
Ass'n, Local 2737, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 29 PERB tf3037 (1996). 
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thousand, spread over approximately 16 years is insufficient to defeat the Association's 
claim of exclusivity.7 
An analysis of "discernible boundary" is only necessary when there appears to be 
sufficient inroads into what is asserted to be the exclusive work of the bargaining unit.8 
This record establishes that, whether the definition of unit work is any initial evaluation, 
as urged by the District, or initial evaluations ordered by the District, as.the Association-
defines unit work, the transfer of the initial evaluation of students to a private 
psychiatrist violated the Act. 
The analysis urged by the District is also inappropriate here. The District argues 
that if the "core component" of the evaluations has been performed by both unit and 
nonunit personnel, the Association lacks exclusivity. We have looked to "core 
component" only in those cases in which nonunit personnel appear to have regularly 
performed several, if not all, of the tasks regularly performed by unit personnel.9 Such is 
not the case here. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the District's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the District: 
7
 See, New York City Transit Auth., 30 PERB 1J3004 (1997), aff'd sub nom. New York 
City Transit Auth. v. PERB, 251 AD2d 583, 31 PERB 1J7012 (2d Dept 1998) motion for 
leave to appeal denied, 31 PERB 117015 (2d Dep't 1998), leave to appeal denied, 92 
NY2d 819, 32 PERB <]7003 (1999). 
8
 See County of Westchester, 33 PERB fl3057 (2000). 
9
 County of Westchester, 31 PERB lf3034 (1998). See also City of Rome, 32 PERB 
P058(1999). 
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1. Cease and desist from unilaterally transferring to nonunit employees the 
exclusive bargaining unit work of educational testing and acting as the CSE 
educational evaluator on cases of initial student referral to the CSE. 
2. Make the Association employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, lost 
as a result of the unilateral transfer of unit work defined above in paragraph 
oneasof.January 20, 2000'with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate until such time as it restores this work to the 
Association's bargaining unit. 
3. Forthwith restore such work to the Association's bargaining unit. 
4. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations at which notices of 
information to the Association employees are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
hael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Merrroer 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES1 FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Port Jefferson Union Free School District (District) in the 
unit represented by the Port Jefferson Teachers' Association (Association) that the District: 
1. Will not unilaterally transfer to nonunit employees the exclusive bargaining unit work of 
educational testing and acting as the Committee for Special Education (CSE) educational 
evaluator on cases of initial student referral to the CSE; 
2. Will make the Association employees whole for wages and benefits, if any, lost as a result 
of the unilateral transfer of unit work defined above in paragraph one as of January 20, 
2000 with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate until such time as it 
restores this work to the Association's bargaining unit; 
3. Will forthwith restore such work to the Association's bargaining unit. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
PORT JEFFERSON UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other materia!. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MAURICE OPARAJI, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22333 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 2, 




BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
MAURICE OPARAJI, pro se 
JAMES SANDNER, GENERAL COUNSEL (KATHERINE A. LEVINE 
of counsel), for Respondent 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Maurice Oparaji to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to an improper practice charge alleging that the United 
FpHprq t i nn o f T p a r h a r e I r i r a l 9 A m o r i r a n FoHora t i nn n f T p a n h p r c MYf^ l IT AFI -P.IO 
(UFT) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
failing to file grievances concerning certain letters placed in his file while he was out on 
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leave. At the close of Oparaji's direct case, UFT made a motion to dismiss. The ALJ 
reserved decision and closed the hearing. 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his numerous exceptions, Oparaji argues, in substance, that the ALJ erred in 
applying the facts to the law. UFT supports the decision of the ALJ. 
- FACTS . . . . . 
The facts of this case are discussed in detail in the ALJ's decision,1 therefore, the 
Board will only review the facts relevant to Oparaji's exceptions. 
Oparaji's charge alleges that on September 7, 1999, he began teaching at the 
Carter G. Woodson Elementary School, P.S. 23K. On October 6, 1999, the principal, 
Patricia A. Hagler Singleton, directed the school security office to prevent Oparaji from 
entering the school. She handed Oparaji a termination letter dated October 5, 1999. 
This incident became the subject of an EEOC complaint. 
In 2000, Oparaji was hired as a teacher of Accounting and Business Practice at 
Springfield Garden High School in District 78. He alleges that, on or about October 10, 
2000, the principal, Dr. Hickson, gave him an ultimatum to either drop the EEOC 
complaint or not teach. On October 19, 2000, while on sick leave, he received certain 
warnings, corrective memos and requests for medical examinations. 
On January 8, 2001, Oparaji received a letter from John W. Lee, Superintendent, 
reassigning him to the Queens High School Office. Subsequently, Superintendent Lee 
informed him, by letter dated January 17, 2001, that his probationary service as a 
teacher of Accounting and Business Practice had been terminated effective February 
35 PERB 1J4564 (2002). 
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16, 2001. On January 23, 2001, Oparaji received a letter from Superintendent Lee's 
office assigning him to Martin Van Buren High School, effective January 23, 2001. 
Oparaji filed grievances over warning letters he received from Dr. Hickson on 
October 12, 2000 and October 17, 2000, but UFT refused to process these grievances 
to arbitration. Oparaji also contends that UFT's representative at Springfield, Stuart 
-Cohen,iailedioiile--grievancesxverxe.rtainJetterspJacedJnOparajT.sJjle.JncludJngih.e.. 
unsatisfactory observation report and unsatisfactory attendance. He filed the instant 
improper practice charge on January 30, 2001. 
DISCUSSION 
Oparaji excepts, inter alia, to the ALJ's decision granting the UFT's motion to 
dismiss. The ALJ, when considering a motion to dismiss, must "assume the truth of all 
the charging party's evidence and give the charging party the benefit of all reasonable 
inferences that could be drawn from those assumed facts."2 Here, the ALJ found that 
the charge consisted of two separate sets of allegations. The first set dealt with UFT's 
alleged violation of the Act by filing grievances but refusing to prosecute them to 
arbitration. The second set dealt with UFT's alleged failure to file grievances. 
The ALJ correctly analyzed the facts consistent with Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc. v. PERB and Diaz.3 As stated in that decision, the standard to prove 
a violation of the duty of fair representation requires that: 
In order to establish a claim for breach of the duty of fair 
representation against a union, there must be a showing that the 
activity, or lack thereof, which formed the basis of the charges 
2
 County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB 1J3013, at 3030 (1984). 
3
 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024, at 7039 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 73 
NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988). 
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against the union was deliberately invidious, arbitrary or founded in 
bad faith, (citations omitted) 
An honest mistake resulting from misunderstanding or lack of 
familiarity with matters of procedure does not rise to the level of the 
requisite arbitrary, discriminatory or bad-faith conduct required to 
establish an improper practice by the union, (citation omitted) 
The record is clear that UFT's representative, Cohen, communicated with Oparaji 
with respect to the filing of grievances and UFT's reasons for deciding not to pursue 
certain grievances to arbitration. There was, however, a conflict in the testimony over 
whether UFT ever received the grievances in the first instance. The ALJ found UFT's 
witness, Cohen, more credible than Oparaji in his explanation that grievances were not 
received. From our review of the record, we agree. As we previously stated in City of 
Lockport and AFSCME, Council 66 (Herberger),4 where, as in the instant motion to 
dismiss, there is a direct conflict in the charging party's evidence that precludes making 
any assumption of the truth of such evidence without first resolving a credibility 
determination, it is appropriate to make such a credibility determination in order to 
decide a motion to dismiss at the close of the charging party's case. Cohen's 
testimony, offered by Oparaji in support of his case, established that he never received 
the grievance forms in question and, in addition, the ALJ also concluded that Cohen 
assisted Oparaji with his grievances while at the school. 
Furthermore, we have consistently held that we would not substitute our 
judgment for that of a union's regarding the filing and prosecution of grievances, for a 
union is given a wide range of reasonableness in these regards. We find, as did the 
422PERB 1J3059 (1989). 
5
 See District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB P062 (1995). 
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ALJ, that UFT did not act in an arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith manner in the 
consideration of the merits of Oparaji's grievances or the manner in which they would 
be processed. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Oparaji's exceptions and we affirm the decision 
of the ALJ. 
-IT IS,..THEREFQRE,.QRD.ERED..that the charge must he, and it herebyJs, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
j/l^L^{^^^y^2 
chael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
\D1 N • 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Erie County Water Authority 
(Authority) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Authority 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) on an 
improper practice charge filed by AFSCME Council 66, Local 930, AFL-CIO, Erie 
County Water Authority Blue Collar Employees Union (AFSCME), when it unilaterally 
subcontracted the exclusive unit work of replacing and testing water meters at 
commercial pit locations, performed by employees in the unit represented by AFSCME. 
The ALJ found that the work in question had been exclusively performed by unit 
employees and ordered the Authority to restore the work to the unit and make unit 
employees whole for any loss of wages or benefits resulting from the subcontracting. 
Board - U-22456 -2 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Authority excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by finding 
that replacing and testing water meters was exclusive bargaining unit work, by rejecting 
the Authority's waiver argument and by ordering that the Authority make whole 
....bargaining-unit employees foranyJoss of wages or benefits. AFSCME supportsthe 
ALJ's decision and argues that the Authority improperly raised waiver as a defense. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are recited in detail in the ALJ's decision1 and are repeated here only 
as necessary to our decision. 
AFSCME represents the Authority's 19 meter service workers, whose duties 
include installing, testing, reading, repairing and replacing water meters, as needed, 
both in residential and commercial locations. 
Prior to 2000, all of the commercial meters worked on by unit employees were 
"ARB" or "touch pad" meters. The Authority had been researching the use of newer 
technology utilizing a radio frequency meter. The manufacturer installed eight new 
meters for the Authority in the fall of 2000 as a demonstration project. The manufacturer 
trained and assisted two unit employees in the installation of the new meters. 
Thereafter, in the spring of 2001, the manufacturer trained four more unit employees. 
1
 35 PERB 1J4580 (2002). 
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The Authority then decided that it would replace all 1200 meters over a seven-
year period. Its decision was that for the first stage of the project, employees would 
install 80 meters and a private contractor, Theilsch Engineering, Inc., would install 400 
meters. The instant charge was filed before any work had been performed by 
Theilsch3 By October 2001, Theilsch had installed 413_meters and unit employees had 
installed 52 meters. 
The record establishes that unit employees have regularly installed, repaired and 
replaced ARB meters as necessary. This work has been exclusive to the unit, with the 
exception of a few occasions when private contractors have picked up a meter from the 
Authority for installation.3 Additionally, unit employees have always performed the 
replacement of existing meters and the testing of those meters. 
The Authority and AFSCME had had some informal discussions about the 
Authority's interest in new technology prior to the Authority's advertising the bid for the 
work in-issue here. 
DISCUSSION 
The Authority argues that because AFSCME knew about the Authority's plans to 
subcontract and did not demand negotiations, it has waived its right to bring this charge. 
We reject this waiver argument made by the Authority for the first time in its post-
There is no argument that any of the work performed by Theilsch constitutes loss of 
exclusivity by unit employees. 
3
 There is no record evidence to establish under what circumstances, and how 
frequently, private contractors performed installation. 
Board - U-22456 -4 
hearing brief to the ALJ. The ALJ correctly found that waiver is an affirmative defense 
that must be pled in a respondent's answer to be considered by the ALJ or this Board.4 
We long ago established the standard to be used to determine whether the 
transfer of unit work to a private contractor was in violation of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. In 
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (hereafter, Magara),5 we held that such a 
transfer was improper where work that has been exclusively performed by employees in 
the unit is subcontracted and "the reassigned tasks are substantially similar to those 
previously performed", unless the qualifications for the job have been significantly 
changed. If such is the case, we then apply a balancing test to determine whether the 
significant change in qualifications resulted in a change in the nature and level of the 
service the employer provides to its constituents. 
Here, the work in-issue involves the installation of radio frequency meters. As 
found by the ALJ, the tasks involved are essentially the same as the tasks involved in 
the installation and repair of the ARB meters. Any additional tasks involved in the testing 
of the new meters is incidental to their installation and is not significant enough to 
distinguish it from work done by the unit. The use of different equipment is likewise 
insufficient to defeat exclusivity.6 
4
 New York City Transit Auth., .20 PERB 1J3037 (1987), confd, 147 AD2d 574, 22 PERB 
117001 (2d Dep't 1989), motion to amend granted, 156 AD2d 689, 23 PERB 1J7002 (2d 
Dep't1989). 
5
 18 PERB 1J3083, at 3182 (1985). 
6
 New York State Thruway Auth., 33 PERB 1J3017 (2000); Town of Shawangunk, 31 
PERB H3036(1998). 
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Likewise, there is no evidence in the record that the level of qualifications has 
changed. Indeed, unit employees have been trained to install and test the new meters 
and have been performing that task since 2001. Therefore, as held by the ALJ, neither 
the tasks required to be performed nor the level of qualifications required for their 
. performanceJnave been significantly changed. _.._ _ _ . 
The Authority argues that our decision in Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, 
Inc.,7 is dispositive. However, that decision was based upon the specific facts in that 
case. We there held that the at-issue work had never been performed by unit 
employees and that there was no exclusivity. Here, the at-issue work is not substantially 
different from tasks performed exclusively by unit employees. We applied Niagara in 
that case and apply it here, but with different results based upon the record evidence. 
That this is a major project that the Authority prefers to have accomplished in a 
specific time frame, likewise, does not change our analysis. There is no record evidence 
of an immediate need for the project to be completed by a specific date, which might be 
construed as a "compelling need" for the Authority to act unilaterally.8 Neither does the 
size of the project allow the Authority to transfer unit work to a private contractor. As we 
7
 30 PERB 1J3068 (1997). 
8
 Compelling need has been construed by this Board as constituting a demonstrated 
emergency, as to which all other options have been exhausted. See Wappingers Cent. 
Sch. Dist, 19 PERB fl3037 (1986); New York City Transit Auth., 19 PERB 1J3043 (1986); 
Addison Cent. Sch. Dist, 16 PERB 1J3099 (1983). 
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held in Union-Endicott Central School District,9 "A project requiring nothing of a 
contractor but the doing of more of exactly the same which unit employees have done 
historically is no basis, in our opinion, for a determination that a union lacks exclusivity 
over the work of that project." 
"We donotconsider it reasonable to base an exclusivity determination solely and 
simply upon the number of tasks to be performed where the tasks themselves and the 
qualifications necessary to their performance are identical whether the work is done by 
a contractor or a unit employee."10 The Authority had at its disposal a number of options 
that could have been explored with AFSCME through negotiations in order to complete 
the project within the desired time frame. It chose to act unilaterally rather than 
negotiate and, in so doing, violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
Lastly, the Authority excepts to the ALJ's remedial order, arguing that no unit 
employees lost wages or benefits. "fT]he purpose of our remedial orders is to make 
parties whole for the wrong sustained by placing them, as nearly as possible, in the 
position they would have been in had the improper practice not been committed."11 The 
Authority and AFSCME will need to determine whether and to what extent the unit 
members receive compensation as a result of the subcontract.12 
9
 29 PERB P056, at 3128 (1996), annulled on other grounds sub nom. Bd. ofEduc. of 
the Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 250 AD2d 82, 31 PERB 1J7016 (3d Dep't 




 Burnt Hills-Ballston Lake Cent. Sch. Dist, 25 PERB 1J3066, at 3139 (1992). 
See New York State ThruwayAuth., 33 PERB ^3017 (2000). 
Board - U-22456 -7 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the Authority's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Authority forthwith: 
1. Restore the work of installing and testing water meters to unit employees; 
- 2. -Make unitmembers-Wholefor any loss of wages or benefits, with interest, 
which occurred as a result of the Authority's subcontracting of meter 
installation and testing; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations ordinarily used to post 
notices of information to employees in the unit represented by AFSCME. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Mionael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/.^n,^£~~~~b^<^j£~-~*~ 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/ Ji)hn T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEWTORKSTATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES1 FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Erie County Water Authority (Authority) in the unit 
represented by AFSCME Council 66, Local 930, AFL-CIO, Erie County Water Authority Blue 
Collar Employees Union that the Authority will forthwith: 
1. Restore the work of installing and testing water meters to unit employees; 
2. Make unit members whole for any loss of wages or benefits, with interest, 
which occurred as a result of the Authority's subcontracting of meter 
installation and testing. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
ERIE COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BLANC A BAEZ, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22617 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent. 
BLANCA BAEZ, pro se 
ROBERT WATERS, GENERAL COUNSEL (CAROL SCHECHTER of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Blanca Baez to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge filed 
individually by Baez which, as amended, alleged that the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (District) violated §§209-a.1 (a) and (c) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it retaliated against her for filing 
grievances pursuant to the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The District 
denied the material allegations of the charge. Hearings were held on December 18, 
2001, February 26, 2002, and March 4, 2002, with all parties present. At the close of 
Baez's direct case, the District moved to dismiss the charge. The ALJ reserved 
decision on the motion. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
Baez has filed several ad idem exceptions to the ALJ's decision. We will address 
the principal exception that alleges the ALJ erred in her analysis of the facts. The 
District has not filed a response. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
-arguments^ we-affirrn-the ALJ's decision, 
FACTS 
We will confine our review to the salient facts relevant to Baez's exceptions. 
Baez has been employed by the District as a second grade teacher at Public 
School 94 (PS 94) in District 15. She has been a teacher for twenty-two years. 
Lawrence Saunders is the principal of PS 94 and George Greenfield is the Executive 
Assistant to the Superintendent of District 15. 
On March 29, 2001, Baez submitted a grievance alleging that she was not 
provided with classroom coverage in order to complete mandatory testing of her 
students. On May 14, 2001, Baez initiated a second grievance complaining that, by 
letter dated May 14, 2001, Saunders directed that she complete the mandatory testing 
or "be considered insubordinate". She characterized this directive as harassing and 
intimidating. On June 5, 2001, Baez filed the last grievance in this matter alleging that 
she had applied for, and did not receive, the position of Literacy Support Teacher at PS 
94. 
The ALJ found that the March 29, 2001 grievance arose from Baez's failure to 
complete mandatory testing of her second grade students within the time allotted. Baez 
had received a warning letter in November 2000 documenting her failure to timely 
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complete the testing. The dispute centered around her demand to Saunders that he 
provide staff to supervise the students in her class who were not being tested. 
Saunders testified that additional staffing has been provided to the extent that funds 
were available. It was uncontroverted that complete coverage has never been available 
and, therefore, teachers were asked to conduct the testing during regular class time or, 
4n-the alternative, use their preparation time for which theyreceived- additional 
preparation time or monetary compensation. 
The May 14, 2001 grievance resulted from Baez's failure to complete the second 
part of the testing program which is done in the spring. The issue was the same. She 
demanded coverage while she performed the tests. Saunders responded with the letter 
to Baez dated May 14, 2001. 
The June 5, 2001 grievance arose when Baez did not receive the position of 
Literacy Support Teacher at PS 94. This grievance, however, was rendered moot 
because the position was eliminated due to lack of funds. In its place, district-wide 
reading recovery positions were created. The testimony is uncontroverted that 
Saunders advised Baez of the newly-created positions and that appointments to the 
position would be made by the District Office. In addition, reading recovery training was 
a prerequisite for consideration to the position. Baez admitted on cross-examination 
that she did not possess this training. Nevertheless, she applied for the position in June 
2001. She was not appointed to the position and she attributed this rejection to her past 
grievance activity. 
Lastly, Baez alleged in her improper practice charge that Saunders refused to 
permit her to bring her teenage daughter with her while she taught summer school in 
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2001. This dispute erupted after the summer session was under way and Saunders 
returned to school to find Baez's daughter in her classroom. The ALJ credited 
Saunders' testimony that she had not requested approval from him nor did he have any 
knowledge that she received approval from any other administrator. Baez admitted on 
cross-examination that in prior years she sought, and had received, prior approval from 
the school administrator in charge of the summer program; however,4his was at a time 
when Saunders was not the administrator. 
The District, through its cross-examination of Baez, elicited that, even though she 
filed numerous grievances, Saunders had given Baez the grade assignment she 
requested, a satisfactory job performance rating, the per session jobs for which she 
applied and summer work. 
DISCUSSION 
As the ALJ correctly recognized, in deciding a motion to dismiss at the close of a 
charging party's case, we "must assume the truth of all the charging party's evidence 
and give the charging party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that could be drawn 
from those assumed facts."1 Even giving Baez every reasonable inference that can be 
drawn from the evidence she introduced at the hearing, she has failed to sustain a 
prima facie case of improper motivation. 
We have consistently held that in order to establish such improper motivation, a 
charging party must prove that he or she had been engaged in protected activity, and 
1
 County of Nassau (Police Dep't), 17 PERB 1J3013, at 3030 (1984). 
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that the respondent had knowledge of and acted because of that activity.2 If the 
charging party proves a prima facie case of improper motivation, the burden of going 
forward shifts to the respondent to establish that its action was motivated by legitimate 
business reasons.3 
On this record, Baez has only established the first two of the three elements of 
the alleged-violation: thatshe was engaged in a protected activity and thatSaunders 
and Greenfield were aware of this activity. There is no evidence on this record that any 
of the alleged actions taken by the District were improperly motivated or were done in 
retaliation for those protected activities. 
As the ALJ noted, and upon our review of the record, we concur that Baez, 
despite filing grievances, was given more support and flexibility to complete the 
mandatory testing of her students than any other teacher. She admitted that she was 
given her grade preference by Saunders, she was given summer work, she was rated 
satisfactory in her work performance and she was given the per session jobs for which 
she applied. Furthermore, by her own admission, she testified that she was not 
qualified for the reading recovery position which she did not receive.4 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Baez's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ. 
2
 State of New York, 33 PERB fl3046 (2000); City of Utica, 33 PERB fl3039 (2000); 
State of New York (SUNY Buffalo), 33 PERB fi3020 (2000); Town ofRamapo, 32 PERB 
1J3077 (1999); City of Salamanca, 18 PERB 1J3012 (1985). 
3
 City of Salamanca, supra, note 2. 
4
 At best, Baez has articulated a dispute over staffing which was covered by the 
contractual grievance process and resolved between the parties. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge herein be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Micb&el R. Cuevas, Chairman 
faOC 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, NASSAU 
LOCAL-830, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22647 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM A. HERBERT 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE, EISMAN & READY, LLP (KENNETH GRAY of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Nassau (County) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), after a hearing, which found a violation 
of §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when the 
County failed to promote one of its full-time employees, John Rinaldo, due to his 
exercise of protected activity under the Act. The Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Nassau Local 830 (CSEA) filed an improper 
practice charge, as amended, on behalf of Rinaldo. The County filed an answer which 
denied the material allegations of the charge and raised the affirmative defenses of 
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failure to state a cause of action, timeliness, jurisdiction, waiver, deferral and failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The County argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred when he denied the 
County's motion to reopen the hearing; the ALJ erred when he found that Rinaldo was 
not promoted because he engaged in protected activity; the ALJ erred by ignoring the 
probative evidence in the record; lastly, the ALJ erred when he ordered the remedy. 
CSEA filed its response to the exceptions. Having reviewed the record and 
considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, but modify the 
remedy. 
FACTS 
We will confine our review of the record to the salient facts relevant to the 
County's exceptions. 
Rinaldo has been employed in the County's department of recreation and parks, 
division of museum services, since 1970. Through promotions, his present civil service 
title is History Museum Crafter 2. This is a noncompetitive class position within the civil 
service. 
In 1995, while assigned to the Old Bethpage Village restoration shop, Rinaldo 
learned that two employees were retiring, one of whom was temporarily in charge of the 
shop. Rinaldo wrote a letter to the then deputy commissioner of the department, 
niL / i iu iao L /cmoai m , a i i u C A J J I O O O C U I I I O I I I I C I C O I n i U C I I iy [ J I U I I I U L C U i u m C i n j u o v i u p c u u v c 
title of History Museum Crafter Supervisor. Dellisanti informed Rinaldo that there was 
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no money in the budget to fill the position at that time, but that he would consider 
Rinaldo in the future. 
In 1997, Rinaldo again communicated with Dellisanti to inquire about the latest 
promotion list which contained his name. Dellisanti again advised Rinaldo that, 
although his name was on the promotion list for supervisor, funding for the position was 
still unclear. 
On December 7, 1997, Rinaldo filed a grievance alleging the County was 
violating the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) by contracting out restoration work 
at the Old Bethpage facility. This grievance was also denied and proceeded to 
arbitration. 
On December 24, 1997, Rinaldo filed a grievance objecting to his transfer from 
Old Bethpage Village to the Sands Point preserve. He also complained that, 
subsequent to the transfer, he was performing out-of-title work. This grievance was 
also denied and proceeded to arbitration. 
On July 18, 2000, Rinaldo filed another grievance alleging that the County had 
transferred unit work at one of its historic locations. This grievance was denied and 
proceeded to arbitration. 
On October 31, 2000, Rinaldo filed a grievance alleging the County failed to offer 
him the position of History Museum Crafter Supervisor. The County denied the 
grievance and advised Rinaldo that another employee was placed in the position 
through demotion. The employee, Louise Schinnick, had been a History Museum 
Crafter Supervisor prior to a promotion to a nonbargaining unit position. She elected to 
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retreat to her prior bargaining unit position for personal reasons.1 Once she returned to 
her former title, Schinnick did not supervise Museum Crafter ones or twos on a daily 
basis.2 
Rinaldo's grievance of December 7, 1999, concerning subcontracting, was 
upheld on January 1, 2001, by an arbitrator; however, his subsequent grievance of 
December 24, 1997, concerning his work transfer and out-of-title work, was denied by 
an arbitrator's award dated February 16, 2001. 
The County's witness, Herbert Mills, who was Rinaldo's supervisor, testified that, 
on or about January 22, 2001, the acting commissioner of the parks and recreation 
department, Vincent Neglia, requested of him a list of employees eligible for promotion.3 
Mills revised the former list from 1997 which included Rinaldo's name. Mills testified 
that the new list that he created for Neglia did not contain Rinaldo's name because, due 
to his transfer to Sands Point, Rinaido was no longer supervising employees.4 While 
working at Sands Point, Rinaido reported to Richard Kappeler. Mills explained that the 
Civil Service Commission reviewed the titles considered for promotion to determine 
whether the candidate possessed the necessary supervisory responsibilities.5 
'Transcript, p. 147. 
2
 Transcript, pp. 148-149. 
3
 Transcript, p. 103. 
4
 Transcript, pp. 80-81. 
5
 Transcript, p. 81. 
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When asked his opinion of Rinaldo's ability as a supervisor, Mills testified that, 
although in 1997 Rinaldo had acted in the capacity of a provisional supervisor, Mills had 
no direct knowledge of Rinaldo's supervisory ability. In 1997, Mills had had a 
conversation with Dale Bennett, Rinaldo's former supervisor, and Bennett indicated that 
"although he [Rinaldo] did fine craft work . . . his supervisory skills were somewhat 
lacking."6 
Rinaldo testified that Mills told him on February 26, 2001 that his name was not 
being placed on the promotional list and that even if his name was on the list, Rinaldo 
would not be promoted because of his grievance activity. Richard Kappeler, Rinaldo's 
supervisor at Sand Point preserve, testified that Mills also told him in February 2001, 
that, even if he could have put Rinaldo's name on the list, Rinaldo would not have 
gotten the position because of his union activity. The ALJ credited the testimony of 
Rinaldo and Kappeler on this point, based upon their demeanor on the stand, their clear 
recitation of their conversations with Mills and the fact that Kappeler was a witness 
without bias or self-interest who corroborated Rinaldo's testimony. 
Mills denied making those statements and testified that his reason for omitting 
Rinaldo's name from the 2001 promotion list was based upon his opinion that Rinaldo 
"would not meet the civil service requirements, and that he wasn't supervising 
anybody."7 Mills explained that the Civil Service Commission rejected one of the 
6
 Transcript, p. 83. 
7
 Transcript, p. 84. 
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promotion candidates from the 2001 list because he was not supervising anybody. 
Mills acknowledged that in 2001 he was aware Rinaldo had filed grievances against the 
County but that this activity did not influence his decision to omit Rinaldo's name from 
the promotion list. Mills was also a member of CSEA. 
On June 18, 2001, Rinaldo filed the instant improper practice charge, as 
amended July 12, 2001, alleging, inter alia, that Mills had informed him that his name 
had been removed from the list because of protected activity. Subsequent to this 
conversation with Mills, Rinaldo spoke with his supervisor, Keppeler, who then informed 
Rinaldo that Mills had made the same comment to him on or about February 22, 2001. 
DISCUSSION 
After the close of the record before the ALJ, the County made a motion to reopen 
the hearing based upon newly discovered evidence. However, the County failed to 
identify with any degree of specificity the evidence upon which its motion was based. 
The ALJ, therefore, denied the motion. We confirm his ruling.9 
CSEA alleged in its charge that the County did not promote Rinaldo because of 
"his engagement in protected activities and the actions of the department are blatantly 
anti-union animus."10 
We have held that in order to establish improper motivation under §§209-a.1(a) 
and (c) of the Act, a charging party must prove that (a) he/she had been engaged in 
8
 Transcript, pp. 94-95. 
9
 County of Nassau, 18 PERB 1J3076 (1985). 
10
 ALJ Exhibit 1. 
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protected activity,11 (b) the respondent had knowledge of, and (c) acted because of that 
activity. If the charging party proves a prima facie case of improper motivation, the 
burden of persuasion shifts to the respondent to establish that its action was motivated 
by legitimate business reasons.12 
We have held that the charging party can establish "[t]he existence of anti-union 
animus . . . by statements or by circumstantial evidence, which may be rebutted by 
presentation of legitimate business reasons for the actions taken, unless found to be 
pretextual".13 Proof that the employer's stated reasons for its conduct are pretextual 
may constitute such circumstantial evidence.14 
It is uncontroverted that the County's management was well aware that Rinaldo 
had filed grievances. We have previously determined that filing grievances is a 
protected right under the Act.15 
11
 Town of Independence, 23 PERB 1J3020 (1990). See also Convention Ctr. Operating 
Corp., 29 PERB 1J3022 (1996); City of Rye, 28 PERB P067 (1995), cont'd, 234 AD2d 
640, 29 PERB H7021 (3d Dep't 1996). 
12
 City of Salamanca, 18 PERB fl3012 (1985). See also City of Albany, 3 PERB fi4507, 
aff'd, 3 PERB H3096 (1970), cont'd in pertinent part, 36 AD2d 348, 4 PERB 1J7008 (3d 
Dep't 1971), aff'd, 29 NY2d 433, 5 PERB TJ7000 (1972). 
13
 Town of Independence , supra note 5 at 3038. See also Convention Ctr. Operating 
Corp., 29 PERB 1J3022 (1996); City of Rye, supra note 5. 
14
 See City ofUtica, 24 PERB 1J3044 (1991); Town of Henrietta, 28 PERB fl4605, aff'd, 
28 PERB fl3Q79 (1995). 
15
 See Town of Huntington, 26 PERB P073 (1993); County of Orleans, 25 PERB 1J3010 
(1992). 
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CSEA meets the first two prongs of the test because Rinaldo was engaged in 
protected activity when he filed the grievances and pursued them to arbitration and the 
County's management was aware of Rinaldo's grievance activity. 
The ALJ found that the County's decision to not recommend Rinaldo for 
promotion was improperly motivated based upon Mills' statements to Rinaldo and 
Keppeler. He found that Mills' decision not to place Rinaldo on the 2001 promotion list 
was based upon Rinaldo's grievance activity and that the County's stated legitimate 
business reasons were pretextual. We agree. 
The ALJ premised his finding of improper motivation on the credibility of CSEA's 
witnesses, disparate treatment of other employees and the timing of Mills' actions. 
Regarding credibility resolutions, we have stated that an ALJ's credibility resolutions are 
entitled to substantial deference and "the greatest weight."16 Although on rare occasion 
we have reversed an ALJ's credibility resolution, we have done so only when the 
objective evidence in the record compelled the conclusion that the ALJ's determination 
was manifestly incorrect, a conclusion which we cannot reach on this record.17 "Our 
determination in this regard is in keeping with the weight appropriately accorded to such 
16
 Captain's Endowment Ass'n, 10 PERB 1J3034, at 3065 (1977). See also Hempstead 
Housing Auth., 12 PERB 1J3054 (1979). 
nCity of Long Beach, 13 PERB 1J3008 (1980), conf'd, City of Long Beach v. PERB, 82 
AD2d 1016, 14 PERB 1T7018 (1st Dep't 1981); Board of Education of the CitySch. Dist. 
of the City of New York, 21 PERB 1J3056 (1988), confd, Board of Education of the City 
Sch. Dist. of the City of New York v. PERB, 168 AD2d 616, 23 PERB 1J7018 (2d Dep't 
1990). 
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credibility determinations by the trier of fact who had the opportunity to observe and 
evaluate the demeanor of all the witnesses."18 
The County argues that an analysis of Rinaldo's work history and Civil Service 
requirements for placement of a name on a promotional list supports its actions with 
respect to Rinaldo. Having found that Mills' decision was improperly motivated, our 
inquiry would normally end there. However, the ALJ ordered that Rinaldo receive the 
promotion to Historic Museum Crafter Supervisor. The County argues that the remedy is 
inappropriate because Rinaldo lacked the supervisory experience for the position. 
Our inquiry, therefore, must also include an analysis of civil service law as it 
applied to the County's reasons. Rinaldo's civil service work history19 indicates that he 
progressed from Laborer I, Laborer II, Groundskeeper I, History Museum Crafter I to 
History Museum Crafter II. These positions were either classified as labor or 
noncompetitive. The noncompetitive class of civil service includes all positions that are 
not in the exempt class20 or the labor class21 and for which it is determined by the 
commission having jurisdiction that it is impractical to ascertain merit and fitness of 
applicants by competitive examination.22 We must also consider that "an eligible list 
18
 Guilderland Teachers Aide Ass'n and Guilderland Cent. Sen. Dist, 32 PERB 1J3023, 
at 3044 (1999). 
19
 Charging Party's Exhibit 1. 
20
 Civil Service Law (CSL) §41. 
21CSL§43(1). 
22
 CSL §42(1).. 
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that has been in existence for one year or more terminates upon the establishment of 
an appropriate new list, unless otherwise prescribed . . . [by law]."23 
The courts have held that the mere appearance of a name on the eligible list for 
appointment is a subjective expectancy and does not create any vested right to 
appointment.24 This is because of the strong public policy that underscores the broad 
hiring discretion vested in appointing authorities under the civil service law. 
Consequently, an applicant has merely "a hope of appointment" and not a legally 
cognizable or protectable interest in the appointment.25 
The record demonstrates that, while Rinaldo's name appeared on the 1997 
promotion list, his duties were subsequently altered in 1997 when he was transferred to 
Sands Point preserve.26 Consequently, in 2001 he no longer met the qualifications for 
the supervisor's position. Furthermore, since the list was in existence for more than one 
year, the County was free to terminate it upon the establishment of a new list. There is 
no evidence in the record that the County was prohibited from establishing a new list. 
Notwithstanding, had Rinaldo's name appeared on the 2001 promotion list, he 
had no more than an "expectancy" of appointment which did not ripen into a vested right 
23CSL§56(1). 
24
 See Cassidy v. Municipal Civil Service Comm. of City of New Rochelle, 37 NY2d 526, 
375 NYS2d 300 (1975). 
25Andriola v. Ortiz, 82 NY2d 320 (1993). 
26
 The record reflects that Rinaldo filed a grievance in 1997 over the transfer. The 
grievance was dismissed by an arbitrator's award, February 16, 2001 (Charging Party 
Exhibit #7). 
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the longer his name appeared on a promotion list. We also note that the 1997 list was 
created in order of priority of appointment.27 Rinaldo was number nine out of ten 
candidates.28 
We find that on this record that the County failed to establish legitimate business 
reasons for its decision not to include Rinaldo on the January 24, 2001 promotion list. 
We find, therefore, that the County's conduct violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Act. 
However, we find that the ALJ's remedy was inappropriate given our review of 
Civil Service Law. The record does not establish that Rinaldo had a right to the 
promotion to Historic Museum Crafter Supervisor, only that he should been considered 
for placement on the promotion list without regard to his grievance activity. We, 
therefore, modify the ALJ's order to reflect this determination and order that the County 
conduct a de novo review of Rinaldo's eligibility for promotion.29 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the County's exceptions except as to 
remedy, and affirm the ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Forthwith conduct a de novo review of John Rinaldo's eligibility 
for promotion to the position of historic museum crafter 
supervisor without consideration of his grievance activity; 
"Transcript, pp. 75-73. 
28
 There is no evidence of how manw names from the 1997 list remained on the 2001 list. 
29
 See Board ofEduc. of the City Sen. Dist. of the City of New York, 21 PERB 1J3056 
(1988), cont'd, 168 AD2d 616, 23 PERB TJ7018 (2d Dep't 1990) (subsequent history 
omitted); County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Sheriff's Office, 20 PERB 1(3009 (1987). 
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2. Cease and desist from failing to consider John Rinaldo for 
promotion because of his exercise of protected rights; 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations throughout the 
County customarily used to communicate information to 
employees represented by CSEA. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
;hael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
(John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Nassau (County) in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Nassau Local 830 (CSEA) that 
the County will: 
1. Forthwith conduct a de novo review of John Rinaldo's eligibility for promotion to the 
position of historic museum crafter supervisor without consideration of his grievance 
activity. 
2. Not fail to consider John Rinaldo for promotion because of his exercise of protected 
rights. 
Dated By - • • • • • • • • • 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and musi not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LYRIC P. SMITH, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23181 
ORGANIZATION OF STAFF ANALYSTS, 
Respondent. 
LYRIC P. SMITH, pro se 
JOAN STERN KIOK, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
By decision dated October 2, 2002,1 we affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's 
(ALJ) dismissal2 of the improper practice charge that Lyric P. Smith had filed against 
the Organization of Staff Analysts (OAS). 
Smith has filed papers with us requesting reconsideration of our decision. 
Smith's motion is not based upon newly discovered evidence such as might warrant 
consideration of a motion to reopen or reconsider.3 His papers merely allege that 
certain factual and legal arguments were not properly addressed in the decision to 
dismiss his charges. His allegations in this respect do not support a motion to reopen or 
1
 35 PERB 1J3033 (2002). 
235PERB 1J4558 (2002). 
3
 See Adjunct Faculty Ass'n, 18 PERB 1J3076 (1985) (motion to reopen) and Town of 
Brookhaven,-\9 PERB 1J3010 (1986) (motion to reconsider). 
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reconsider and would be more properly addressed in a court review of the Board's 
decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, we decline to reconsider our October 2, 2002 
decision in this matter. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
ael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 294, 
— Petitioner, - - - ._-
-and- CASE NO. C-5231 
TOWN OF GREENVILLE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 294 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-5231 - 2 -
Included: All full-time highway workers, laborers, drivers and foreman. 
Excluded: Superintendent of Highways; full-time Deputy Superintendent of 
Highways, and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 294. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession.1 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
D bolt, 
^ L 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
-Member Mitchell recused himself from consideration of this case. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF WOODBURY POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5239 
TOWN OF WOODBURY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Woodbury Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc., has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate and described 
beiow, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5239 page 2 
Included: All full-time Police Dispatchers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate coJJectiveJy_wJth.theTow.n.Df.WQOdbju.ry„Police..Benevolentj^ s.so.c.ia.tiQn,Jn.c,.... 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
i 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AND 
POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
...-- -_ - - -. _ Petitioner, ...._; 
-and- CASE NO. C-5241 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT UNION, 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding- having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Law Enforcement Union, 
District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority 
-The petition sought to decertify the intervenor and be certified as the 
negotiating representative. 
Certification - C-5241 page 2 
of the employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances: 
Included: Security Supervisors Unit, which is inclusive of the following titles: 
Corrections Lieutenant, Sergeant Park Patrol, Security Hospital 
Supervising Treatment Assistant, Chief Environmental Conservation 
Officer, Forest Ranger 3, Lieutenant Park Patrol, Chief Security Officer, 
Chief Safety and Security Officer 1, Chief Safety and Security Officer 2, 
Environmental Conservation Investigator 3, Captain Park Patrol, 
Security Services Assistant 3, Supervising Parks and Recreation 
Forest Ranger, Ski Patrol Director. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the New York State Law Enforcement Union, District Council 
82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
' (y\y^^>^e\^^ L*~ 
Micbael R. Cuevas^Chairman 
Johh T. Mitchell, Member 
/" "\ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF TUXEDO PARK BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
- Petitioner,...... _ 
-and- CASE NO. C-5243 
VILLAGE OF TUXEDO PARK, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Village of Tuxedo Park Benevolent 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
W n l / ^ x w O O •H^ni** A U r t l i i n n i n i - r t m i - r t p r t M + n + i n n f^M* 4-1-»r\ m n - n n n r t "^i-fr ft/\ll/\Al!»irt !•% n <~| *^+1«-» 4 -m !»•»<-» n w r t 
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the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5243 - 2 -
Included: All full-time Traffic Guards. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Village of Tuxedo Park Benevolent Association. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
""^  i/\yw^^U<^JCC-^:~^ 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
bbott/Member 
Johh T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF DEERPARK POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5244 
TOWN OF DEERPARK, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Town of Deerpark Police Benevolent 
Assocation has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
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the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5244 - 2 -
Included: All full-time and part-time police officers. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Town of Deerpark Police Benevolent Association. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times 
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
^ 4 L W 4 ^ ^ T g . jm 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5251 
ILION CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described beiow, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5251 - 2 -
Included: Teachers Aides, Teaching Assistants and Food Service Helpers. 
Excluded: Secretary to the Superintendent, Senior Account Clerk-Treasurer, 
Payroll Clerk, Secretary to the Business Manager, School Lunch 
Manager, all administrators, substitutes, seasonal and casual 
employees, employees regularly scheduled to work less than 
twenty(20) hours; per.we_ek,.and a|l.pthei_e_mpjpyees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: December 12, 2002 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
